UN Security Council Reform: Africa’s Seat at the Table Is Overdue

 

The United Nations Security Council was designed in 1945 to reflect the world that existed after the Second World War. That world no longer exists. Africa’s continued exclusion from permanent membership is not an oversight. It is a structural injustice that undermines the legitimacy of the body tasked with maintaining global peace — on a continent that hosts more active UN peacekeeping operations than any other.

Africa accounts for roughly 60 percent of the UN Security Council’s active agenda items. The continent contributes the largest share of troops to UN peacekeeping missions. It is home to over 1.5 billion people across 54 states. And yet it holds zero permanent seats on the council — and zero veto rights1. This is not a technicality. It determines whose wars get sustained attention, whose ceasefires get enforced, and whose civilian populations get protection.

The Ezulwini Consensus: What Africa Has Actually Asked For

Africa’s official position on Security Council reform has been formally articulated since 2005 through the Ezulwini Consensus, adopted by the African Union. It is worth being precise about what the continent is asking for because the demand is often caricatured as vague or unrealistic.

The Ezulwini Consensus calls for two permanent seats for Africa with full veto rights, and five non-permanent seats, reflecting Africa’s numerical weight among the UN membership2. The African Union has also made clear that the specific countries to fill those seats should be determined by Africa itself, not imposed from outside — a reasonable insistence given the continent’s diversity and the sensitivity around which states would represent it.

“Africa is the only region of the world that is not represented among the permanent members of the Security Council. This is not a defensible position in 2025.” — African Union Commission, March 2025

The G4 countries — Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan — have long advocated for their own permanent seats alongside African representation. In 2025, intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform resumed with renewed momentum inside the UN General Assembly, buoyed in part by the 80th anniversary of the United Nations providing political cover for structural revisiting of the Charter3. Whether that momentum will translate into actual reform is a different question.

Why the P5 Resistance Is Not About Procedure

The five permanent members — the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China — have each used procedural and principled arguments to slow or obstruct Security Council reform for decades. Those arguments deserve to be named for what they are: the defence of structural privilege.

France and the United Kingdom have periodically expressed rhetorical support for African permanent membership while ensuring that the practical pathway remains blocked. The United States has supported an expanded council in principle but opposed any reform that dilutes American procedural dominance4. Russia and China have used the reform debate strategically, expressing support for developing world representation in diplomatic forums while opposing binding reform timelines.

54 — African Union member states with no permanent UNSC seat

60% — Share of active UNSC agenda items linked to Africa

0 — Number of times an African state has exercised a veto since 1945

2005 — Year Africa formally adopted the Ezulwini Consensus

The veto itself is the structural obstacle that no procedural reform proposal has satisfactorily resolved. Charter amendment under Article 108 requires ratification by two-thirds of UN member states, including all five permanent members5. In plain terms, the P5 can each individually block any reform that reduces their own power. The architecture of the council protects itself. Any honest conversation about Africa’s seat at the table has to acknowledge that the formal barrier to change is a system that rewards those with the power to block it.

The Legitimacy Deficit Is Getting Harder to Ignore

The argument for African permanent membership is not just about fairness, though fairness alone would be sufficient. It is about whether the Security Council can credibly claim to act on behalf of international peace and security while systematically excluding the region that features most prominently in its own agenda.

The Sudan crisis illustrates the problem acutely. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which has produced one of the largest displacement crises in the world since April 2023, has been discussed repeatedly at the Security Council6. Russia vetoed a 2024 resolution calling for a ceasefire. The countries most directly affected by the humanitarian consequences — Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic — have no veto and no permanent seat. Their ability to shape the council’s response is structurally constrained by a system designed before most of them existed as independent states.

The Democratic Republic of Congo presents a similar case. The eastern DRC has experienced continuous armed conflict for three decades. The MONUSCO peacekeeping force, the largest in UN history at its peak, operated there for over twenty years7. The DRC’s government eventually requested MONUSCO’s withdrawal in 2023, partly out of frustration with its limitations. African states had long flagged concerns about the mission’s mandate and effectiveness. Those concerns carried advisory weight at the council — not decisive weight.

The Reform Window in 2025 and 2026

The 2025 UN General Assembly session, coinciding with the organisation’s 80th anniversary, produced what observers described as the most substantive intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in two decades. The ‘Pact for the Future’ adopted at the Summit of the Future in September 2024 included explicit language on Security Council reform, with African states pushing for binding timelines rather than further deliberation.

In March 2025, the African Union submitted a renewed position paper to the intergovernmental negotiations reaffirming the Ezulwini Consensus and calling for a text-based negotiation process with a defined conclusion date8. The AU’s presentation received public backing from the G77 and China bloc, which collectively represents the majority of UN membership. Whether that political weight translates into Charter amendment is a different matter entirely.

The United States signalled in early 2025 that it would support permanent seats for India and Japan — and potentially one African state — in a reformed council, but maintained its opposition to extending veto rights to new permanent members. That position has been flatly rejected by the AU. A permanent seat without veto rights is not what the Ezulwini Consensus asked for, and African diplomats have been consistent in saying that permanent membership without veto creates a two-tier system that entrenches, rather than corrects, the existing hierarchy.

Why This Matters Beyond Symbolism

Security Council decisions have direct, material consequences for people’s lives. They authorise peacekeeping missions and define their mandates. They impose sanctions and determine who is subject to them. They refer situations to the International Criminal Court and decide, in the same chamber, which situations do not get referred. They authorise the use of force and set the terms under which it is exercised.

Africa’s absence from permanent membership means that on each of these decisions, the continent’s interests are represented through elected non-permanent members with two-year terms, through diplomatic lobbying, and through the three African members that rotate through the council’s elected seats9. That is not nothing. But it is structurally inferior to the power held by five states whose geopolitical interests frequently diverge sharply from Africa’s own.

The ICC referral pattern makes this concrete. Sudan was referred to the ICC by the Security Council in 2005. Libya was referred in 2011. Both referrals happened without the consent of the states involved and were driven primarily by Western permanent members. No Western state has ever been subject to a Security Council ICC referral10. The selective application of international justice mechanisms through the council is not coincidental. It reflects who holds permanent power in the room.

Reforming the Security Council to include Africa’s permanent, veto-carrying representation would not resolve all of this. But it would change the structural calculus. African states would have the ability to block referrals that they believe are politically motivated. They would have a decisive voice on peacekeeping mandates affecting their own region. They would be inside the room when the terms of international security are set, not outside it making representations.

The argument against reform — that it will make the council less decisive, more gridlocked, less functional — deserves a direct answer. The council is already gridlocked. Russia’s veto has blocked action on Ukraine. China and Russia together have blocked action on Syria for over a decade. The United States has blocked resolutions on Gaza. The dysfunction of the existing council is not caused by too many voices. It is caused by the entrenched privilege of five states whose interests consistently diverge from global justice. Adding African permanent members with veto rights does not create that problem. It redistributes it, which is exactly what those who benefit from the current arrangement oppose.

The question is not whether the Security Council will reform. The question is whether the political cost of continued exclusion will eventually exceed the political cost of change. For Africa’s 1.5 billion people, that threshold was passed a long time ago. The P5 have not yet reached theirs.

REFERENCES

[1] United Nations Department of Peace Operations (2025, updated). Peacekeeping Fact Sheet — Troop and Police Contributing Countries [Africa as largest regional troop contributor; 60% of active UNSC agenda Africa-related]. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors

[2] African Union (2005, March). The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations — The Ezulwini Consensus [two permanent seats with veto; five non-permanent seats; AU to determine nominees]. https://au.int/en/documents/20050307/ezulwini-consensus

[3] United Nations General Assembly (2024, September). Pact for the Future [Summit of the Future reform language; UNSC reform text; 80th anniversary intergovernmental negotiation commitment]. https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future

[4] Council on Foreign Relations (2025, updated). The UN Security Council — Backgrounder [US position on UNSC expansion; support for India, Japan, one Africa without veto extension; P5 reform obstruction history]. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council

[5] United Nations Charter, Articles 108–109 (1945). Amendment procedures requiring two-thirds General Assembly ratification and all P5 consent [structural veto on Charter reform]. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-18

[6] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2025, updated). Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report [displacement crisis statistics; UNSC ceasefire resolution vetoes; Sudan conflict briefings 2024–2025]. https://www.unocha.org/sudan

[7] United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC — MONUSCO (2023–2024). MONUSCO Transition and Withdrawal Timeline [largest peacekeeping operation history; DRC government withdrawal request 2023; mission limitations]. https://monusco.unmissions.org

[8] African Union Commission (2025, March). AU Submission to UN Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform [Ezulwini reaffirmation; text-based negotiation demand; defined conclusion timeline; G77 and China support]. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250310/au-submission-unsc-reform

 [9] Security Council Report (2025). African Elected Members of the Security Council — Research Report [rotating three African non-permanent seats; two-year terms; structural constraints on influence]. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org

 [10] International Criminal Court (2025, updated). Situations Under Investigation — Sudan and Libya [Security Council referrals; non-consent referrals; absence of Western state referrals; 2005 Sudan referral Resolution 1593; 2011 Libya referral Resolution 1970]. https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations


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